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WHERE, BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD,
GOESHE? THESEARCHFOREMPATHY
IN THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
CLARENCE THOMAS
Eric L. Muller*

I. "BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD THERE GO I"
It was a riveting moment. Asked by a senator "why you
want this job," 1 then-Judge Clarence Thomas volunteered this to
the Senate Judiciary Committee and the nation:
You know, on my current court, I have occasion to look out
the window that faces C Street, and there are converted buses
that bring in the criminal defendants to our criminal justice
system, busload after busload. And you look out, and you say
to yourself, and I say to myself almost every day, But for the
2
grace of God there go I.

As an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, Judge Thomas said he would have the chance to "bring
something different to the Court, ... [to] walk in the shoes of the
people who are affected by what the Court does. " 3
These striking images were part of a larger strategy to link
the nominee with the tradition of Thurgood Marshall, the man
he had been nominated to replace. Marshall had spent a career
walking in the shoes of the least fortunate, both as an attorney
and as a judge. President Bush's decision to replace Marshall
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B.,
Brown University; J.D., Yale University. I thank Sara Sun Beale, Leslie BrandenMuller, Robert Burt, Michael Gerhardt, Joel Selig, Gary Simson, and Maureen Ryan for
reading and commenting on this essay. I wrote this article while on the faculty of the
University of Wyoming College of Law; that school's Hopper Research Fund provided
generous financial support.
I. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 259 (1991) ["Confirmation Hearings, Part 1"].
2. !d. at 260.
3. !d.
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with Thomas, whose career and commitments seemed so at odds
with Marshall's, had triggered concern from some quarters, pro4
test from others. Judge Thomas's advisers in the Bush Administration tried to blunt the opposition by encouraging Thomas to
adopt what they called the "Pin Point Strategy" -a strategy of
emphasizing his impoverished, racism-tinged upbringing in the
tiny town of Pin Point, Georgia, rather than his professional accomplishments and commitments. 5
The Pin Point Strategy was ultimately a strategy of persuading Thomas's inquisitors of his powers of empathy. In his
opening statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Thomas
recalled a time just after graduating from Yale Law School,
when he had no money and no place to live. Margaret Bush
Wilson, who, Thomas reminded the committee, "would later become chairperson of the NAACP," 6 offered Thomas lodging at
her house. As he was leaving at the end of the summer, he asked
her what he owed her. She said, '"Just along the way help
someone who is in your position. "'7 This was what Thomas said
he would bring to the Court: a commitment to helping those
least able to help themselves. "(W]hen all is said and done,"
Thomas concluded, "the little guy, the average person, the people of Pin Point, the real people of America will be affected not
only by what we as judges do, but by the way we do our jobs." 8
Thomas went no further in identifying the "little guy," the
person "in his position," with whom he professed a special capacity for empathy. He did not explicitly describe the "little
guy" as black, or as poor, or as the victim of race- or class-based
discrimination. But sensitivity to race and class bias were plainly
behind his words. From the first moment of his testimony, he
emphasized to the Committee that his life in Pin Point had been
9
10
one of grinding poverty and of vicious race discrimination. He
4. See Timothy M. Phelps and Helen Wintemitz, Capitol Games 61-79 (Hyperion,
1992) (describing early opposition to Thomas nomination); Manning Marable, Clarence
Thomas and the Crisis of Black Political Culture, in Toni Morrison, ed., Race-ing Justice,
En-gendering Power 61, 70 (Pantheon Books, 1992) (describing opposition by black organizations and leaders).
5. See Richard L. Berke, In Thomas Hearing Room, Spirits of Hearing Past, N.Y.
Times, A25 (Sept. 11, 1991); Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the
Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 969,971,980-81
(1992).

6.

See Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 109 (cited in note 1).
Id.
8. Id. at llO.
9. Id. at 108 ("We lived in one room in a tenement. We shared a kitchen with
other tenants and we had a common bathroom in the backyard which was unworkable
and unusable. It was hard, but it was all we had and all there was. Our mother only
7.
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was also careful to place himself openly on the path of the civil
rights movement many had accused him of abandoning. He first
praised Thurgood Marshall as "one of the great architects of the
legal battles to open doors that seemed so hopelessly and permanently sealed and to knock down barriers that seemed so insurmountable to those of us in the Pin Point, [Georgia's] of the
world."n Next came kind words for "[t]he civil rights movement,
Rev. Martin Luther King and the SCLC, Roy Wilkins and the
NAACP, Whitney Young and the Urban League, Fannie Lou
Haemer, Rosa Parks and Dorothy Hite": "But for them," Tho12
mas said, "there would have been no road to travel." Finally,
when the Judiciary Committee took up Anita Hill's allegations
that he had sexually harassed her, Thomas immediately labelled
the accusations as racist, 13 and based on white America's most
14
vicious stereotypes of black men. While he did not come out
and say it in so many words, his message was clear: the "little
guy" who would be his special concern was the "little guy" who
had also been the special concern of Justice Marshall. 15
Once Judge Thomas became Justice Thomas, this compassionate image tarnished quickly. Empath~ was difficult to discern in his dissent in Hudson v. McMillan,' one of his very early
opinions. 17 Prison guards handcuffed and shackled Hudson and
earned $20 every 2 weeks as a maid, not enough to take care of us. So she arranged for
us to live with our grandparents later, in 1955. Imagine, if you will, two little boys with all
their belongings in two grocery bags.").
10. Id. at 108-09 ("I attended segregated parochial schools. . . . [M)y grandparents
grew up and lived their Jives in an era of blatant segregation and overt discrimination.
Their sense of fairness was molded in a crucible of unfairness. I watched as my grandfa.
ther was called 'boy.' I watched as my grandmother suffered the indignity of being denied the use of a bathroom.")
11. Id. at 109 (alteration in original).
12. Id.
13. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 157 (1991) ("And from my standpoint, as a black
American, as far as I am concerned, it is a high-tech lynching for uppity-blacks .... ")
["Confirmation Hearings, Part 4").
14. Id. at 202 ("Senator, the language throughout the history of this country, and
certainly throughout my life, language about the sexual prowess of black men, language
about the sex organs of black men, and the sizes, et cetera, that kind of language has
been used about black men as long as I have been on the face of this Earth. These are
charges that play into racist, bigoted stereotypes and these are the kinds of charges that
are impossible to wash off.").
15. See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience:
Bias and lmpaniality of Judges and Jurors, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201, 1201 (1992)
("Thomas presented himself as ... enriched by his experiences of poverty and racial discrimination and therefore attentive to the concerns of disadvantaged people.").
16. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
17. The Hudson dissent was Justice Thomas's fifth opinion.
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pummelled and kicked him in the mouth, eyes, chest, stomach,
and back, while their supervisor warned them "not to have too
18
much fun. " Hudson emerged from the thrashing with minor
bruises, a swollen face, mouth, and lip, loosened teeth, and a
19
cracked dental plate. The Supreme Court held by a vote of
seven to two that this use of excessive force amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, even if
his injuries were not serious.20 In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Thomas criticized the majority for forgetting that "prison was
not a more con~enial place in the early years of the Republic
1
than it is today." Justice Thomas saw the majority's "expansion
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause beyond all
bounds of history and precedent" as "yet another manifestation
of the pervasive view that the Federal Constitution must address
all ills in our society. " 22 "The Eighth Amendment is not, and
should not be turned into, a National Code of Prison Regulation. "23
This opinion was the first in a pattern that Justice Thomas
has followed to the present day. In his first six terms on the
Court, he has been among the Court's most consistent opponents of the claims of criminal defendants 24 -so consistent, in
fact, that some have wondered whether he was being sincere at
his confirmation hearings when he professed such empathy for
the incarcerated inmates he saw streaming from prison buses.25
18. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4.
19. ld.
20. Id. at 5-10.
21. Id. at 19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
23. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24. See note 71 and accompanying text.
25. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 983-84 (cited in note 5); Joyce A.
Baugh and Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas: Confirmation Veracity Meets Performance Reality, 19 Seattle U. L. Rev. 455, 474-80, 495-96 (1996); Anton Bell, Clarence
Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21 N.C. Central L.J. 194,205,210-12,213-14 (1995).
There is, of course, a separate literature on the question of whether Justice Thomas was
truthful at his second set of confirmation hearings, when he denied Professor Anita Hill's
allegations of sexual harassment. See Jane Mayer and Jill Abramson, Strange Justice
(Houglton Mifflin, 1994); David Brock, The Real Anita Hill (The Free Press, 1993); Michael Thelwell, False, Fleeting, Perjured Clarence: Yale's Brightest and Blackest Go to
Washington, in Morrison, Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power at 86, 115-21 (cited in
note 4); Curtis D. Lebaron, Looking for Verbal Deception in Clarence Thomas's Testimony, in Sandra L. Ragan, et al., eds., The Lynching of Language 113 (U. of Illinois
Press, 1996); Gary J. Simson, Thomas's Supreme Unfitness-A Letter to the SeiUJle on
Ad~·ise and Consent, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 619, 633-36 (1993). One well-known commentator has even argued that Thomas committed perjury at the second set of hearings, and
could be impeached for it. See Mark V. Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional
Problems, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 466,474-77 (1995) (book review). In this essay, I nei-
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26

How could a Justice "walk[ing] in their shoes" rule against
them so frequently?
In this Essay I suggest a tentative answer to that question. I
do so by contrasting two votes of Justice Thomas's, one a dissentinH vote for the criminal defendant in Unite_d States v.. ~il
liams, a case from 1992, and the other a vote With the maJonty
for the government in United States v. Armstrong,]ll a 1996 case.
My answer is tentative because I can base it only on guesswork.
Justice Thomas did not write an opinion in either of these two
cases; he merely joined opinions written by others. This essay is
an attempt-concededly a speculative one-to understand what
may have prompted Justice Thomas to cast his highly unusual
vote in Williams.
The two cases bore important similarities. In both, criminal
defendants asked the Court to invoke its supervisory power over
29
the administration of federal criminal justice to require prosecutors to honor higher standards of fairness and openness than
the Constitution and the rules of criminal procedure required.
In Williams, the defendant contended that the prosecutor should
be required to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury considering an indictment. In Armstrong, the defendant sought discovery to support his claim that the prosecutor was illegally singling out black suspects for prosecution under draconian federal
crack cocaine laws. The Court rejected both defendants' claims.
If Justice Thomas were to find his empathic voice in one of
these cases, Armstrong would have been the more obvious
choice. Of the two, Armstrong was the case about the "little
guy;" it engaged far more directly than Williams the sorts of
compassionate concerns that Justice Thomas voiced so eloquently at his confirmation hearings. Yet it was in Williams, not
in Armstrong, where Justice Thomas broke from his progovernment ~attern, parted company with his ideological allies
on the Court, and voted with the criminal defendant.

ther consider nor question Thomas's truthfulness in responding to Hill's allegations of
sexual harassment.
26. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1).
27. 504 u.s. 36 (1992).
28. 517 u.s. 456 (1996).
29. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
30. See note 73; see also Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 Yale L.J. 93, 134 n.253 (1996)
(describing pattern of agreement among Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas in criminal cases).
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There is at least faint promise in Justice Thomas's vote in
Williams; it shows him fulfilling his commitment to Margaret
Bush Wilson that "along the way [he would) help someone who
31
is in [his] position." But when compared with the vote in Armstrong, his Williams vote also shows that he has yet to broaden
the range of his empathy much beyond his own unique circumstances. The defendant in Williams was publicly accused of serious wrongdoing by an entity that had before it only the accuser's
side of the story. For Justice Thomas, the target of Anita Hill's
leaked accusations of sexual harassment, this must have been a
painfully familiar scenario-familiar enough to dislodge him
from his usual pro-government stance and trigger a rare vote for
a defendant in a case that divided the Court. Williams therefore
suggests that Justice Thomas can indeed "walk in the shoes"32 of
the criminal defendant. The trouble is that the shoes must be
remarkably like his own.
II. WILLIAMS AND ARMSTRONG
A. WILLIAMS

United States v. Williams was a prosecution of an Oklahoma
businessman for bank fraud. The government's theory of the
case was that Williams had intentionally submitted misleading
information to banks in order to obtain loans and loan renewals.33 Specifically, the government had evidence that Williams
had depicted nearly worthless assets as "current assets" worth
millions of dollars on several financial statements, and on others
had listed interest income as coming from outside sources when
in fact it was coming from him. 34 On the strength of this evidence, a federal grand jury had indicted him for willfully de35
frauding a bank.
What the government failed to do in the grand jury was to
present rather powerful evidence that tended to show that Williams had not misled the banks willfully. The government's theory of the case was that Williams had intentionally distorted his
depiction of his assets in his dealings with the banks. But this
31.
32.
33.

Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 109 (cited in note 1).
Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1).
United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 899 (lOth Cir. 1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 36

(1992).

34.
35.

ld.
ld.
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distortion was not something he shared just with the banks.
Rather, he characterized his assets the same way everywhere.
On all of his tax returns and financial statements, and even on
his own internal ledgers, he accounted for the assets and interest
income in exactly the same way as he had in his submissions to
the banks. 36 Williams claimed that this evidence was substantially exculpatory because it suggested an innocent explanation
for the way in which he had presented his assets to the banks.
Williams asked the district court to dismiss the indictment for
the government's failure to present this material exculpatory
37
evidence to the grand jury. The district court granted the motion,38 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 39
The question for the Supreme Court was whether a federal
prosecutor must present material exculpatory evidence to a
grand jury considering an indictment. Williams did not contend
that the Constitution, federal statutes, or the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure imposed such a duty;40 the grand jufj' has
historically heard just the government's side of the case, and
Williams did not contend otherwise. Instead, Williams contended that the district court had the power to impose the duty
under its supervisory power over the administration of criminal
42
justice. The supervisory power is an authority of uncertain origin;43 federal courts use this power to require greater integrity,
36. Id. at 900.
37. Id. at 899-900.
38. Id. at 900.
39. Id. at 900-04.
40. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,45 (1992).
41. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 300 (the grand jury was "only to hear
evidence on behalf of the prosecution: for the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an enquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined(.)");
Francis Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal Pleading and Practice § 360, at 248 (Kay and
Brother, 8th ed. 1880) ("The question before the grand jury being whether a bill is to be
found, the general rule is that they should hear no other evidence but that adduced by
the prosecution.").
An excellent history of the grand jury is Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the
Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 701 (1972). See also Andrew D.
Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L. Rev.
260, 280-88 (1995) (briefly summarizing the checkered history of the grand jury as a
shield for the accused).
42. Williams, 504 U.S. at 45.
43. In her article Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1433
(1984), Professor Sara Sun Beale argues powerfully that the supervisory power doctrine
"has blurred the constitutional and statutory limitations on the authority of the federal
courts_ and has fostered the erroneous view that the federal courts exercise general superviSion over federal prosecutors and investigators." Id. at 1434. She contends that
while the ~onstit~tional, statutory, and common law powers of the federal courts do support certam apphcat10ns of the supervisory power, no source of authority supports the
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accuracy, or fairness in federal criminal proceedings than the
Constitution, statutes, and rules of criminal procedure demand. 44
The Court rejected Williams's claim. Writing for a bare
five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia observed that the Court's supervisory power is at its weakest in the context of the grand jury.
The grand jury, Scalia explained, is virtually a freestanding institution; it operates almost wholly separately from the courts.45
Thus, "any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their
own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited
one, not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over
46
their own proceedings." This very limited power, Scalia concluded, could not possibly support Williams's requested disclosure rule. To require the prosecutor to divulge exculpatory evidence to the grand jury would "alter the grand jury's historical
role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory
47
body." The supervisory power-whatever its foundation and
whatever its reaches-would not support such a dramatic reconstruction of the grand jury.
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Thomas and Justices O'Connor and Blackmun. His dissent was perhaps the
most scathing broadside against prosecutorial misconduct to appear in the United States Reports since 1935, when Justice Sutherland wrote that "while [a federal prosecutor] may strike hard
48
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." In that case, Justice Sutherland catalo~ued a number of foul blows that the
prosecutor had struck, and reversed the conviction to punish
the prosecutor for the misconduct. 50 In his dissent in Williams,
Justice Stevens picked up where Justice Sutherland had left off.
Comparing prosecutorial misconduct to the many-headed "Hydra slain by Hercules,"51 Justice Stevens added a number of
other types of misconduct to Justice Sutherland's list-including
misconduct in the grand jury.52 He refused to join the majority in
"hold[ing] that countless forms of prosecutorial misconduct must
broad power of supervision that the federal courts now claim for themselves. ld. at 14641520.
44. Id. at 1448-64 (describing the scope of the supervisory power exercised by both
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts).
45. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47-50.
46. Id. at 50.
47. ld. at 51.
48. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935).
49. Id. at 84-88.
50. ld. at 89.
51. Williams, 504 U.S. at 60 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 61-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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be tolerated-no matter how prejudicial they may be, or how seriously they may distort the legitimate function of the grand
53
jury-simply because they are not proscribed" by rule. Instead,
Justice Stevens insisted that "[u]nrestrained prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings is inconsistent with the ad54
ministration of justice in the federal courts." Those courts, he
concluded, should be permitted to use their supervisory power to
dismiss indictments tainted by such misconduct.
B.

ARMSTRONG

United States v. Armstrong also presented the Court with an
opportunity to use its supervisory power to require more thorough disclosure from federal prosecutors than the Constitution,
statutes, and rules required. Just as in Williams, however, the
Court refused to do so. In Armstrong, several black men
charged with federal crack cocaine offenses in the Central District of California contended that they were the victims of
impermissibly selective prosecution. They claimed that the
United States Attorney had selected them for prosecution in
federal court, where penalties for crack cocaine distribution are
especially harsh, 55 because of their race. They moved in the district court for discovery to substantiate that claim. In support of
their motion they proffered an affidavit demonstrating that
every one of the twenty-four crack cocaine cases that the Federal
Public Defender for the Central District of California handled
during 1991 had been against a black defendant. 56 They also
submitted affidavits suggesting that equal numbers of blacks and
non-blacks use and deal in crack, and that non-black defendants
are regularly prosecuted in state court for crack offenses. 57
The district court granted the motion. 58 It ordered the
United States Attorney to provide the defendants with a list of
cases from the preceding three years in which the government
had charged both crack cocaine and firearms offenses, to identify
the race of the defendants in those cases, and to account for why
those defendants were prosecuted in the federal system. 59 When
the government refused to comply with the discovery order, the
53. !d. at 68 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See text accompanying note 110.
56. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,459 (1996).
57. Id. at 460.
58. Id. at 461.
59. Id.; see also United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 19'95) (en
bane), rev'd, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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district court dismissed the indictments.60 An en bane panel of
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal order. 61
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. It held that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did
not permit any discovery to support a selective prosecution
62
claim, and that the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause did not require such discovery in the absence of compelling proof that the government had
failed to prosecute non-black crack dealers. 63
Justice Stevens again dissented, this time alone. 64 He did
not take issue with the majority's conclusion that neither the
rules nor the Constitution authorized the district court's discovery order. 65 He relied instead on the district court's supervisory
power, 66 as he had in Williams. According to Justice Stevens, the
district jud§e perceived a "conspicuous racial pattern of cases
before her" 7 -a pattern emanating from the office of the United
States Attorney for the Central District of California, "a member and an officer of the bar of that District Court." 68 Justice
Stevens concluded that "[i]f a District Judge has reason to suspect that [the United States Attorney], or a member of her staff,
has singled out particular defendants for prosecution on the basis of their race, it is surely appropriate for the Judge to deter69
mine whether there is a factual basis for such a concern. "
70
Faced with the "disturbing" evidence of racially disparate
prosecution that the defendants had presented, the district court,
in Stevens's view, properly exercised its supervisory power over
the administration of criminal justice by ordering discovery that
might help explain the disparity.
III. THE ODDITY OF JUSTICE THOMAS'S VOTES IN
WILLIAMS AND ARMSTRONG
By any measure, Justice Thomas's dissenting vote in Williams was extraordinary. First, and most simply, Justice Tho60. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463.
61. See Armstrong, 48 F.3d at 1510.
62. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463.
63. ld. at 464-70.
64. Id. at 476-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
67. ld. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
69. ld. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. ld. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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mas's Williams vote was a pro-defendant vote. For each of his
first five Terms, Justice Thomas was among the Court's most re71
liable opponents of the defendant's position in criminal cases.
Second, his Williams vote was a pro-defendant vote in a case that
was not decided by a unanimous Court. About two-thirds of
Justice Thomas's pro-defendant votes have come in cases where
he joined all eight of his colleagues in reaching an uncontroversial pro-defendant position. 72 Third, by voting for the defendant
in Williams, Justice Thomas visibly parted company with Justice
Scalia, the author of the majority opinion. In each of his first
five Terms on the Court, Justice Thomas agreed with Justice
Scalia at least eighty-three percent of the time, and, in one term,
as much as eighty-eight percent of the time. 73 Finally, Justice
Thomas's split with Justice Scalia in Williams was especially notable because Justice Thomas, rather than Justice Scalia, was the
one to vote for the defendant. Of the eleven criminal cases in
which Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas parted company during
71. See Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24
Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 14-16 (1996) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1995 Voting Behavior]
(in 1995 Term, Thomas voted for government in 66.7% of state criminal cases and 71.4%
of federal criminal cases); Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1994 Term, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 13, 15 (1995) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1994
Voting Behavior] (in 1994 Term, Thomas voted for government in 91.67% of state criminal cases and 61.54% of federal criminal cases); Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 269, 286, 290 {1994) [hereinafter Wilkins, et a1.,1993 Voting Behavior) (in 1993 Term, Thomas voted for government
in 87.5% of state criminal cases and 83.3% of federal criminal cases); Richard G. Wilkins,
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1992 Term, 8 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 229, 244, 246
(1994) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1992 Voting Behavior) (in 1992 Term, Thomas voted
for government in 85.71% of state criminal cases and 81.25% of federal criminal cases);
Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. Pub.
L. 1, 13-14 (1992) [hereinafter Wilkins, et al., 1991 Voting Behavior) (in 1991 Term,
Thomas voted for government in 75% of state criminal cases and 54.55% of federal
criminal cases).
72. Justice Thomas cast thirty-two pro-defendant votes in his first five Terms. Of
these, nineteen were in cases that the Court decided unanimously. See Wilkins, et al.,
1995 Voting Behavior at 15-16 (cited in note 71); Wilkins, et a1.,1994 Voting Behavior at
13, 15 (cited in note 71); Wilkins, et al., 1993 Voting Behavior at 286, 290 (cited in note
71); Wilkins, et al., 1992 Voting Behavior at 244, 246 (cited in note 71); Wilkins, et al.,
1991 Voting Behavior at 13-14 (cited in note 71).
73. See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 368 {1996) (in 1995
Term, Thomas and Scalia agreed in 87.2% of cases); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 10, 341 (1995) (in 1994 Term, Thomas and Scalia agreed in 88.2% of
cases); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 373 (1994) (in 1993 Term,
Thomas and Scalia agreed in 82.8% of cases); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 27, 373 (1993) (in 1992 Term, Thomas and Scalia agreed in 86% of cases); The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 19, 379 {1992) (in 1991 Term, Thomas and
Scalia agreed in 85.9% of cases). See also Muller, 106 Yale L. J. at 134 n.253 (cited in
note 30) (noting similarity of Scalia's and Thomas's voting patterns, especially in criminal
cases).
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74

Justice Thomas's first five Terms, Justice Thomas has cast an
unambiguously pro-defendant vote in only two of them. 75
Perhaps, then, Williams was a case that gave Justice Thomas
the chance to make good on his commitment to "bring something different to the Court, . . . [to] walk in the shoes of the
people who are affected by what the Court does." 76 But if he was
going to pick a single criminal case in which to empathize with
the plight of a criminal defendant, Williams was an odd choice.
At his hearings, Thomas testified that his special concern on the
Court would be "the little guy, the average person, the people of
77
Pin Point," as well as the "busload after busload" 78 of shackled
prisoners he saw arriving at the federal courthouse each day.
John H. Williams was anything but a "little guy," and it is fair to
guess that his circumstances bore scant resemblance to the conditions of poverty and disadvantage of Thomas's own Pin Point
years, or of the inmates on the prison bus. Williams was a Tulsa
businessman and investor whose specialty was venture capital. 79
In the transactions that resulted in his indictment, his investments in several companies had generated notes receivable, pay74. The eleven cases are Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996); Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995); Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995); Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992); Dawson v. Delaware,
503 U.S. 159 (1992); and Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
75. In addition to Williams, Justice Thomas split with Justice Scalia and cast an unambiguously pro-defendant vote only in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
For a discussion of that case, see note 141.
Justice Thomas also paned company with Justice Scalia and cast a pro-defendant
vote in Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992), but his suppon for the defendant's position was at best tepid. In his Richmond concurrence, he explicitly stated that he believed
the authority on which the majority's opinion partly rested had been wrongly decided.
See id. at 52-53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority only because
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), which Thomas thought was wrongly decided, was
still good law).
Additionally, in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), Justice Thomas parted
with Justice Scalia and voted for the defendant, but the question in the case was one of
appellate practice; the beneficiary of Justice Thomas's legal position in the case could just
as easily have been the government had the case come to the Court in a different posture. Ornelas established that an appellate court must apply de novo review to a trial
court's finding on the question of whether law enforcement agents had reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect and probable cause to search. Id. at 1663. The application of this
standard benefited the defendant in Ornelas because he was the one who had lost in the
trial court, but the government would benefit equally from de novo review in a case
where it was the appellant.
76. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1).
77. Id. at 110.
78. Id. at 260.
79. See United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898,899 (lOth Cir. 1990) (Williams's investments were in new ventures with negative net worth), rev'd, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
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able to him, of between five and six million dollars. His business dealings and holdings were complex enough to require the
81
services of an independent accounting firm. The judicial opinions disclose nothing more about Williams. But even this handful of facts reveals that he probably was not "the average person" to whom Justice Thomas alluded before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Of the 706 residents of Pin Point, Georgia,82 it seems safe to assume that relatively few are venture capitalists.
Williams was also an odd moment for Justice Thomas to
find his empathic voice because the defendant's legal position in
that case was rather tenuous. It is now settled that the federal
courts enjoy a power to supervise some aspects of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. But supervision
of the grand jury is at the very fringes of that power, arguably
beyond them. 83 The Court has rejected a number of requests to
use its supervisory power to alter the grand jury's methods of
taking evidence, always out of concern for protecting the independence of the grand jury.84 In those rare instances when the
Court has used its supervisory power in the setting of the grand
85
jury, it has confined the power to enforcing codified rules; it has
resisted using the power to devise new rules of grand jury practice.86 Williams was an invitation to use the supervisory power to
create a brand new rule of grand jury practice; it is not too surprising that the Court declined the invitation.
80. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
81. Id. at 902.
82. Telephone Interview with John Powell, Planner, Chatham County-Savannah
Metropolitan Planning Commission, Savannah, Georgia (May 28, 1997). Mr. Powell
based his estimate of 706 residents on information he gathered from the 1990 Census.
He also stated that Pin Point is an old residential neighborhood that has changed little
for many years, and that its population has remained about the same for decades.
83. See Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 1491-93 (cited in note 43).
84. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) {declining to apply the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings because of "the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury"); Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359, 364 {1956) (declining to enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceedings
because that "would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution.").
85. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (finding that error involving
Rule 6(d) did not warrant reversal of convictions); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,
487 U.S. 250 (1988) (affirming Tenth Circuit opinion that district court did not have
authority to dismiss indictment even though there was a violation of Rule 6(d)).
86. See generally Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 1492-93, 1522 (cited in note 43) (arguing that the Court lacks authority to use the supervisory power to impose substantive
rules of grand jury practice beyond those in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6); United States v. Chanen,
549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) (exercise of supervisory power over grand jury might
violate separation of powers).
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Indeed, the government's position in Williams should have
been especially appealing to Justice Thomas because it was
deeply conservative-conservative in the sense of tending to
preserve existing institutions. This sort of conservatism is at the
core of the judicial philosophy that Justice Thomas and Justice
81
Scalia share. For example, Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia
in decrying the Court's prohibition of gender-based peremptory
challenges in part because the change "imperil[led] a practice
that has been considered an essential part of fair jury trial since
the dawn of the common law." 88 To make inroads on the free
exercise of the peremptory challenge was to "vandaliz[e] our
people's traditions. "89 Of course, the grand jury has been hearing just the government's side of the case for at least as long as
90
lawyers have been using peremptory challenges. To require the
prosecutor to present the defendant's side of the case to the
91
grand jury would seem a comparable act of vandalism. Yet Justice Thomas voted for such a change-a perplexing vote for a
traditionalist.
Justice Thomas's pro-government vote in Armstrong was
statistically far less remarkable; it was just another in the largely
unbroken line of pro-government votes in non-unanimous decisions.92 But Armstrong presented a much more logical place
than Williams for him to walk in the shoes of "the little guy" to
whom he referred in his confirmation hearing testimony. First,
and most obviously, Armstrong was truly a case about the little
87. On the traditionalism in Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, see Katharine T.
Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995
Wis. L. Rev. 303, 315-19; Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 130-31 (Harvard U.
Press, 1993). Justice Thomas has also been labelled a traditionalist because of his apparent use of the Burkean model as well as some aspects of formalism, see R. Randall Kelso,
The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 St. Mary's L.J. 1051,
1087 n.l13 (1995); this comes as no surprise in light of his high rate of agreement with
Justice Scalia. See note 73.
88. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ref. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. ld. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. See note 41 (summarizing grand jury history); see also Carl Stephenson and
Frederick G. Marcham, eds. and trans., 1 Sources of English Constitutional History 77
(Harpers & Brothers, 1937) (predecessor to grand jury, hearing only accusations of
wrongdoing, mentioned in the Assize of Clarendon of 1166).
91. Justice Scalia took great pains in Williams to point out how the defendant's
proposed rule would violate the centuries-old common law of the grand jury. See United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-55 (1992). It was largely for this reason that Justice
Scalia concluded that the supervisory power "would not permit judicial reshaping of the
grand jury institution[.)" ld. at 50; see also id. at 52 ("Imposing upon the prosecutor a
legal obligation to present exculpatory evidence in his possession would be incompatible" with the ancient history of the grand jury).
92. See note 71.
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guy, the "busload after busload" of criminal defendants streaming into the federal courthouse. In 1992, Justice Thomas's first
full year on the Court, forty-three percent of the defendants
prosecuted in United States District Courts were drug defendants.93 Almost three-quarters of those defendants were detained for some or all of the time prior to trial, and therefore
94
transported by bus for court appearances. And about one-half
95
of all drug defendants were charged with cocaine offenses. So
when Justice Thomas spoke of the "busload after busload" of
criminal defendants that he saw arriving at the federal courthouse every morning, he was talking about people just like the
96
defendants in Armstrong.
Second, Armstrong presented a somewhat less controversial
opportunity than Williams for invoking the Court's supervisory
powers.97 While the defendant's claim in Williams pushed the
98
Court to the very edges of its supervisory power, and maybe
beyond them, the Armstrong defendants sought to engage the
power a bit closer to its core. As Justice Scalia noted in Williams, federal courts have long used the supervisory power to
"control their own procedures" (as opposed to the procedures of
an independent body such as the grand jury), to "improve the
truth-finding process of the trial," and "to prevent parties from
reaping benefit or incurring harm from violations of substantive
or procedural rules ... governing matters apart from the trial itself[.]"99 The Armstrong defendants were seeking a comparably
ordinary use of the supervisory power: they were asking for pretrial discovery. Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have used the supervisory power to craft rules of discovery and disclosure. 100 Justice Thomas is plainly sensitive to
93. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1995 at
467 tbl.5.18 (1996) (of 66,502 defendants prosecuted in federal court in 1992,28,479 were
prosecuted for drug offenses).
94. Id. at 460 tbl.5.11 (74.9 % of all defendants charged with drug offenses were
detained for some period of time before trial).
95. Id. at 440 tbl.4.39 (in 1995, 49.5% of all drug arrests by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration were for cocaine offenses).
96. By this I do not mean African-Americans; at his confirmation hearings, Justice
Thomas did not lay claim to an explicitly race-based empathy in criminal cases, and I am
not suggesting that he ought to reserve a special degree of compassion for black defendants. Instead, Justice Thomas claimed a special capacity to empathize with disadvantaged people generally and with disadvantaged criminal defendants specifically. See Minow, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1201 (cited in note 15). The Armstrong defendants were
far more representative of that group than was John Williams.
97. But cf. note 102.
98. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,45-46 (1992) (emphasis deleted).
100. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1975) (trial court may use su-
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prosecutorial misconduct- the "Hydra slain by Hercules" 101 and has no doctrinal qualms about deploying the supervisory
power to punish and deter such misconduct. His Williams vote
makes this clear. Armstrong presented a more commonplace
scenario than Williams for invoking that power, 102 yet in Armstrong, Justice Thomas refused to do so. 103
Finally, the merits of the Armstrong defendants' claim
seemed to engage the concerns and views that Justice Thomas
shared at his confirmation hearings far more directly than a case
such as Williams. Senator John Danforth introduced Clarence
Thomas to the Senate Judiciary Committee with the nominee's
own words from a speech he had given: "What is more amoral,"
pervisory power to compel defendant to disclose defense investigator's report to prosecutor for use in cross-examining investigator); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69
(1957) (district court may use supervisory power to compel government to produce previously recorded statements of its witnesses for defendant's use in cross-examination);
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957) (district court may use supervisory
power to require government to disclose identity of confidential informant who may be
material witness); United States v. Roybal, 566 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1977) (district
court may dismiss indictment under supervisory powers to sanction the government for
failing to comply with discovery order directing it to turn over information not required
to be produced under the Constitution, statute, or rule); United States v. Fischel, 686 F.2d
1082, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1982) (district court may use supervisory power to compel government to disclose to defendant the address of an informant whose identity is known).
Cf. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Supreme
Court may, in the exercise of its supervisory powers, require in certain circumstances that
a federal trial court ask voir dire questions of prospective jurors designed to discover racial prejudice).
101. Williams, 504 U.S. at 60 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. I do not mean to suggest that Justice Stevens's proposed use of the supervisory
power in his Armstrong dissent was entirely uncontroversial. Part of what made the Williams majority balk at using the supervisory power was a concern about separation of
powers: The grand jury is an institution that is separate and largely independent from the
court. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 47-50); see generally Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. (cited in
note 43) (arguing that exercise of supervisory power to control prosecutors and grand
juries violates separation of powers). Armstrong presented a similar difficulty. Due to
separation-of-powers concerns, the courts have long hesitated to scrutinize a prosecutor's
exercise of discretion over whom and what to prosecute. See Wayte v. United States, 470
u.s. 598,607-08 (1985).
Still, in using the supervisory power, the Court has never considered itself as circumscribed by the independence of the prosecutor as by the independence of the grand jury.
While it has balked at altering grand jury practice, it has not hesitated to impose a great
variety of obligations-including disclosure obligations-on the prosecutor. See note
100; see generally Beale, 84 Colum. L. Rev. at 1444-55 (cited in note 43). Furthermore,
even if Justice Stevens's proposed use of the supervisory power in Armstrong was every
bit as troubling as the rejected use in Williams, the fact remains that Justice Thomas endorsed Justice Stevens's proposed use in Williams, yet refused to do so in Armstrong.
103. In this Justice Thomas was not completely alone; Justice O'Connor also voted
against deploying the supervisory power in Armstrong after voting to deploy it in Williams. Her vote in Williams, however, was neither as striking nor as seemingly revealing
as Justice Thomas's, because a pro-defendant vote in a criminal case is nowhere near as
rare an event for her as it has been for Thomas.
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Thomas had once asked, "than the vicious cancer of racial discrimination[,]" a cancer that "exists in the factories and the
104
Senator Danforth
plants and the corporate board rooms[?]"
dared the Committee to "[n]ame one other member of the Supreme Court that talks like that." 105 And Justice Thomas, in his
own way, continued the dare a few moments later in his own
opening statement: he focussed unabashedly on the poverty of
his own childhood in Pin Point, and on the race discrimination
that he and his family had endured. 106 These experiences, and
the values he had learned in coping with them and in watching
others do the same, were what he had "always carried in [his]
heart, " 107 and would continue to carry with him in his work on
the Court. 108
At bottom, the Armstrong defendants' assertion was that
just as race discrimination exists "in the factories and the plants
and the corporate board rooms," it could also make its way into
a prosecutor's office. They claimed that the United States Attorney for the Central District of California appeared to be selecting only black defendants for prosecution under the harsh
federal crack cocaine laws. They sought discovery to learn
whether this was true.
While the Court dismissed as unconvincing the evidence of
disparate treatment that the Armstrong defendants tendered, 109
their claim was by no means frivolous. Indeed, their claim arrived in the Supreme Court amid a swirl of very public allegations that the federal sentencing laws for crack cocaine were
having an overwhelmingly disparate impact on blacks. And
these were not just allegations from civil rights organizations and
lobbying groups; these were allegations from the United States
Sentencing Commission, the federal agency responsible for the
design of the federal sentencing system.
In its Omnibus Crime Prevention Act of 1986, Congress
adopted a one hundred-to-one quantity ratio for determining
crack cocaine sentences: a defendant convicted of a crack cocaine trafficking offense would be subject to the same mandatory minimum sentence as a defendant convicted of trafficking in

I 04.
I05.
I 06.
I07.
108.
I09.

Confirmation Hearings, Part I at 97 (cited in note I).
Id.
See notes 9-I 0.
Confirmation Hearings, Part I at 110 (cited in note I).
Id.
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,470 (1996).
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one hundred times as much powder cocaine. 110 The federal sentencing guidelines extended this one hundred-to-one ratio above
the statutory mandatory minimums to all crack cocaine sentences.111 It quickly became apparent that these laws had a dramatically disparate impact on blacks: blacks were the overwhelming targets of crack prosecutions, and received longer
prison sentences than whites, both for crack offenses and for
112
Congress responded to complaints
drug offenses overall.
about this disparate impact by directing the Sentencing Commission to submit a report to it addressing problems in cocaine sen•
113
tencmg.
The Commission's response was blunt: it reached the "inescapable conclusion that Blacks comprise the largest percentage
of those affected by the penalties associated with crack co114
caine"- a "matter of great concern. " The Commission noted
that whereas blacks accounted for 88.3 percent of federal crack
distribution convictions in 1993, and whites only 4.1 percent, 52
percent of reported crack users were white, and 38 percent
black. 115 While the Commission found no evidence that Congress enacted the crack sentencing program with a racially discriminatory purpose, the Commission found the program's racially disparate impact severe enough to warrant change.
Specifically, the Commission found that the disparate impact
made it "reasonable to require the existence of sufficient policy
bases to support such a sentencing scheme regardless of racial
impact." 116 In other words, the Commission concluded that if the
sentencing laws were to include a penalty differential with a severely disparate impact on a racial group, it would have to support that differential with clear, and clearly race-neutral, poli110. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), (A) (1994).
111. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual§ 20l.l(c) (19%).
112. See Douglas C. McDonald and Kenneth E. Carlson, Sentencing in the Federal
Courts: Does Race Matter?, U.S. Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics 83-114 (Dec.
1993); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1233, 1266-71 (1996).
113. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097 (1994) ("Not later than
December 31, 1994, the United States Sentencing Commission shall submit a report to
Congress on issues relating to sentences applicable to offenses involving the possession
or distribution of all forms of cocaine. The report shall address the differences in penalty
levels that apply to different forms of cocaine and include any recommendations that the
Commission may have for retention or modification of such differences in penalty levels.").
114. U.S. Sentencing Commission: Executive Summary of Special Repon on Cocaine
and Federal Sentencing Policy, 56 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2159,2168 (March 1, 1995).
115. ld. at 2167-2168.
116. ld. at 2168.
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cies. 117 The Commission unanimously recommended to Congress
in the middle of 1995-just a few months before the Supreme
118
Court granted certiorari in Armstrong - that it scrap the one
hundred-to-one ratio, replace it with a lesser ratio, and make a
119
number of changes to the sentencing guidelines.
Against this background, the Armstrong defendants argued
to the Supreme Court that a federal prosecutor's office appeared
to be singling out blacks for crack prosecution at the federal
level. This too was a claim with at least some support. In addition to the largely anecdotal evidence the defendants themselves
tendered, a study of crack charging practices in Los Angeles revealed that blacks were significantly likelier than whites to be
prosecuted at the federallevel. 120 What the defendants sought to
discover in their case was strikingly similar to what the United
States Sentencing Commission had found to be dispositive for
the crack sentencing system as a whole: whether a set of clear
and race-neutral policies would explain and justify the racially
disparate pattern. As Randall Kennedy has recently argued, the
Court should have allowed the trial judge the freedom to order
such discovery, since the defendants were "seeking [it] based
upon preliminary indications that should have been seen as
raising a substantial question re~arding the racial evenhandedness of a U.S. Attorney's Office." 21
Yet the Court-including Justice Thomas-overturned the
district court's order requiring the prosecutor to supply the de117. See Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and
Official Commentary, 57 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2095, 2097 (May 10, 1995); U.S. Sentencing Commission: Materials Concerning Sentencing for Crack Cocaine Offenses, 57 Crim.
L. Rep. (BNA) 2127, 2131 (May 31, 1995) (majority statement) ("When a sentencing
policy has a severe disproportionate impact on a minority group, it is important that sufficient bases exist for the policy. The law should not draw distinctions that single out
some offenders for harsher punishment unless these distinctions are clearly related to a
legitimate policy goal.").
118. See United States v. Armstrong, 516 U.S. 942 (1995).
119. See U.S. Sentencing Commission: Material Concerning Sentencing for Crack
Cocaine Offenses, 57 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2127 (May 31, 1995). The Commission was
not unanimous on the appropriate ratio to replace one hundred-to-one. The majority
favored a one-to-one ratio between crack and powder cocaine quantities. Id. at 2129-30.
Four dissenters opposed the one-to-one ratio. Id. at 2131-34.
In October of 1995,just days before the Supreme Court voted to hear the Armstrong
case, the Congress voted to retain the one hundred-to-one ratio. See Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995).
120. See Richard Berk and Alec Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race and Crack
Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 Fed. Sent. Rep., 36,36-38 (July-Aug. 1993). But see
Joseph E. Finley, Crack Charging in Los Angeles: Do Statistics Tell the Whole Truth
?bout "Selective Prosecution?," 6 Fed. Sent. Rep., 113, 113-15 (Sept.-Oct. 1993) (criticizmg the Berk and Campbell study).
121. Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 358 (Pantheon Books, 1997).
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fendants with the information necessary to such an inquiry. Justice Stevens, in dissent, explicitly linked the discovery issue in
Armstrong to the simmering public controversy about federal
crack sentencing: "The extraordinary severity of the imposed
penalties and the troubling racial patterns of enforcement," he
wrote, "give rise to a special concern about the fairness of
charging practices for crack offenses" 122 -a concern that the district judge was right to explore through the supervisory power.
Justice Thomas, who learned from his own experience that race
discrimination is a "cancer ... [that] exists in the factories and
the plants and the corporate board rooms," 123 might have been
expected to agree.
He did not. Instead he voted as he almost always does in
criminal cases: for the government, and with Justice Scalia. So
Williams remains the oddity, the outlier, the brief moment of
empathy in what has so far been a career of little compassion for
the criminal defendant. Why? What was it that allowed Justice
Thomas to rediscover, if only for an instant, the compassionate
voice of his confirmation hearings?
IV. JOHN WILLIAMS AS CLARENCE THOMAS?
The answer, I think, lies in the confirmation hearings themselves-not the first set, in which the Judiciary Committee explored Justice Thomas's views and judicial philosophy, but the
second set, in which the Committee publicly investigated Anita
Hill's charge that Thomas had sexually harassed her. This second set of hearings became necessary after the media learned
that Hill had given a statement to both the Committee and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation charging Thomas with sexual
harassment while he was her su&ervisor at the Equal EmployThomas had initially been
ment Opportunity Commission.
confronted with Hill's allegations confidentially, at his home,
and he had denied them categorically.125 For about a week, Hill's
allegations remained confidential. But sometime during that
week, Hill's statement was leaked to the press. On October 6,
1991, National Public Radio and a New York newspaper broke
the story. 126 The Judiciary Committee was forced to schedule
122. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,1494 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 97 (cited in note 1).
124. See Paul Simon, Advice & Consent 103-08 (National Press Books, 1992); Mayer
and Abramson, Strange Justice at 241-57 (cited in note 25).
125. See Mayer and Abramson, Strange Justice at 246-47 (cited in note 25).
126. Id. at 254-61.
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additional public hearings into Hill's allegations.m Those did
not take place until October 11. So for five days the nation
heard from. Anita Hill and debated her allegations without
hearing from Thomas. The nation did not hear his side of the
stor~ until he again took his seat as a witness before the Committee. 28
129
Thomas denied Hill's allegations, as was expected. But he
also pressed further, taking the offensive and attacking the entire
confirmation process. "My family and I have been done a grave
and irreparable injustice," he said, referring not just to the "selective[]" and "distorted" leak[ing] of Hill's allegations against
him, but also to the larger "ordeal" he had been through:
[C]harges of drug abuse, antisemitism, wife-beating, drug use
by family members .... Reporters sneaking into my garage to
examine books I read.
Reporters and interest groups
swarming over divorce papers, looking for dirt. Unnamed
people starting preposterous and damaging rumors. Calls all
130
over the country specifically requesting dirt.

"This is not American," Thomas charged. "This is Kafkaesque. It has got to stop." 131 Calling up a powerful racial image,
Thomas told the Committee that he would "not provide the rope
for [his] own lynching or for further humiliation." 132 "Confirm
me if you want, don't confirm me if you are so led," he demanded, "but let this process end." 133
Later that day, after Anita Hill had spent hours making and
defending her allegations to the Committee and the nation,
Thomas appeared again. And this time he was even more explicit about what was wrong with the proceedings-proceedings
he said "should never occur in America. " 134 The problem was
that the process was completely one-sided and utterly public:

127. See Simon, Advice & Consent at 107-08 (cited in note 124).
128. Justice Thomas made no public appearances during the five days between the
publication of Anita HiJI's charges and the second round of the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings. His only comment came in the form of a terse, five-sentence affidavit
denying the charges, which Senator John Danforth distributed on his behalf. See Phelps
and Winternitz, Capitol Games at 268 (cited in note 4).
129. See Confirmation Hearings, Part 4 at 5-8 (cited in note 13).
130. ld. at 8.
131. ld.
132. Id. at 10; see also id. at 157 (hearings examining Hill's charges were "a high-tech
lynching for uppity-blacks.... ").
133. Id. at 9.
134. Id. at 157.
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This is a case in which this sleaze, this dirt was searched for by
staffers of members of this committee, was then leaked to the
media, and this committee and this body validated it and displayed it in prime time over our entire Nation .... This is not
a closed room .... This is not an opportunity to talk about difficult
matters
privately or in a closed environment. This is a
•
135

CirCUS.

The target of his anger was the Committee itself. 136 Having
heard only Hill's side of the story, the Committee had placed its
imprimatur on Hill's devastating accusations 137 by making them
public and calling on him publicly to respond and defend his actions and his reputation. And this he saw as an impossible task:
"There is nothing this committee, this body or this country can
do to give me my good name back, nothing. " 138
Seen in the light of his experience before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Justice Thomas's vote in Williams may become
more understandable. In the Williams dissent that Justice Thomas joined, Justice Stevens pointed out that the price of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury is especially high because a grand jury has a unique capacity to injure a defendant,
especially an innocent one: "'For while in theory a trial provides
the defendant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the
charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment
will often have a devastating personal and professional impact
that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo. "' 139 The trial,
in other words, is just the defendant's appeal from the prosecutor's press release. For Justice Thomas, that may have been the
insight that resolved the entire case. John Williams had suffered
the devastation of a public accusation of serious wrongdoing by a
deliberative body that had heard one side of the story- his accuser's-but had not heard his. This was Justice Thomas's own
confirmation saga played out in the setting of a criminal trial. It
is hard to believe that Justice Thomas could have missed the
striking similarity between Williams's plight and his own. And it
is easy to see Justice Thomas's vote as a vote against a kind of
135. Id.
136. Id. at 185 (charging that the Committee's handling of the hearings was "ruining
the country").
137. When I say that Hill's allegations were "devastating," I do not mean to suggest
that they were false. As noted earlier, see note 25, I do not address the truthfulness of
her allegations, or of Justice Thomas's denial, in this Essay. I mean only to suggest that
from Thomas's perspective, the allegations were surely devastating.
138. Confirmation Hearings, Part 4 at 9 (cited in note 13).
139. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 63 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807,817 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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unfairness that Thomas himself knew all too well from his own
recent and bitter experience.
V. AN UNDEVELOPED EMPATHY
As a young man, Justice Thomas promised a benefactor that
140
he would help someone in his position. I believe that he found
141
And if so, he should not be
that someone in John Williams.
criticized for that. Thomas learned from painful personal experience how catastrophic a public charge of wrongdoing can be,
and when the time came, he allowed that heightened sensitivity
to inform his understanding of what might have otherwise
seemed a dry question of grand ~ury practice. This is what we
expect of Supreme Court justices: 42 We hope that their deliberations, votes, and opinions will reflect not just what they have

140. See text accompanying note 7.
141. It is tempting to say that Justice Thomas may also have met such a someone in
Keith Jacobson, the defendant in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), the only
other case in which he split with Justice Scalia to cast an unambiguously pro-defendant
vote. See note 75. In that case Justice Thomas joined a bare five-justice majority in
holding that the government had entrapped Jacobson into buying child pornography by
trying over and over again for years to entice him into a purchase without any evidence
that he had ever bought child pornography before. The majority opinion, which Justice
Thomas joined, expressed disgust with the government's investigative methods in the
case: "When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run
afoul of the law, the courts should intervene." Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54.
It would not seem outlandish to speculate that Justice Thomas's own experiences
with "(r]eporters sneaking into my garage to examine books I read(.] (r]eporters and interest groups swarming over divorce papers, looking for dirt," Confirmation Hearings,
Part 4 at 8 (cited in note 13), may have sensitized him to overly prying and intrusive law
enforcement techniques. In fact, Jane Mayer and Jill Abramson have reported that a
former clerk of Justice Thomas's chalked up his vote in Jacobson to his confirmation experiences: "[A]fter all Thomas had gone through, the justice was especially sensitive to
the overreaching powers of prosecutors." Mayer and Abramson, Strange Justice at 358
(cited in note 25). However, the breadth of the clerk's assertion about Thomas's sensitivity to prosecutorial misconduct seems questionable; Justice Thomas has not seen fit to
condemn other instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 456 (1995) (5-4 decision) (Justice Thomas dissenting from Court's conclusion
that prosecutor in state trial suppressed material exculpatory evidence).
142. Indeed, we tend to worry a bit about justices who seem to lack broad experience: such was the case when the allegedly hermitic David Souter was nominated to the
Court. See Ruth Marcus and Michael Isikoff, Souter Declines Comment on Abortion,
Nominee Moves to Dispel Image as Judge Lacking Compassion, Wash. Post, A1 (Sept.
14, 1990); Keith C. Epstein, Souter Appears to Shun Current Events, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), 1990 WL 4622518 (Sept. 9, 1990); Roy L. Brooks, Weigh Souter's Human
Resume, Houston Chron., 15 (Aug. 2, 1990); Ray Gibson & Mitchell Locin, Souter's Career Largely Untouched by Broad Issues, Chi. Trib., 1 (July 29, 1990); Carl M. Cannon,
Souter, Others Singled Out for Never Having Tied Knot, Orange County Reg. (Cal.), 1
(July 29, 1990).
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learned from briefs and books, but also what they have seen in
their personal and professionallives. 143
However, Justice Thomas's Williams vote stands virtually
144
alone. The nominee who claimed a unique ability to imagine
himself as the inmate on the prison bus has rarely displayed that
imagination in his first years on the Court. He proved himself
unable to step into the shoes of the defendants in Armstrong,
just as he was unable to step into the shoes of the pummeled inmate in Hudson v. McMillan or the defendants in so many of the
other criminal cases he has been called upon to review. A wide
gap has opened between his words as a nominee and his votes as
a justice. The gap is hard to miss, and commentators have not
missed it. They have asked whether Thomas may have been insincere when he told the Judiciary Committee that he looked
upon the busloads of inmates arriving at court each morning and
said to himself "But for the grace of God there go I. " 145
His vote in Williams suggests that he was not entirely insincere. But compared to his vote in Armstrong and dozens of
other criminal cases, it also suggests that he has not yet broadened his empathy to anything like the full range he promised at
his confirmation hearings. To say "[b]ut for the grace of God
there go 1," as Justice Thomas himself explained, is to recognize
that "you have the same fate, or could have, as those individuals"146 -the inmates on the bus. To empathize with someone
who actually shares your fate is not especially difficult; this was
the empathy that I believe motivated Justice Thomas in Williams. On the other hand, to empathize with a criminal defendant whose fate could have been yours under different condi147
tions is a good deal harder. The effort carries with it enormous
danger: feelings of kinship with someone accused of serious
crime can tri~er revulsion and fear just as easily as compassion
and support. 1 If Justice Thomas does feel a unique kinship with
143. See Minow, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1203 (cited in note 15) ("We ... want
[those who sit in judgment] to have the ability to empathize with others, to know what is
fair in this world, not in a laboratory. And we want ... judges to have, and to remember,
experiences that enable their empathy and evaluative judgments.").
144. See notes 71·75 and accompanying text.
145. See note 25.
146. Confirmation Hearings, Part 1 at 260 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
147. Charles Black identified this difficulty, and preached the necessity of overcoming it, in his moving essay, "The Humane Imagination in the Great Society." See Charles
L. Black, Jr., The Humane Imagination in the Great Society, in The Humane Imagination
1, 4·7 (Oxbow Press, 1986).
148. Indeed, revulsion and fear might be the likelier response. It is not pleasant to
dwell on the fact that you and a dangerous criminal have something-perhaps even the
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the inmates on the prison bus, it is by no means clear that that
feeling of kinship will produce actions we would recognize as
compassionate. The road on which Justice Thomas set himself
at his confirmation hearings is a decidedly rocky one.
It is also, however, a road that others have travelled before
him. Other Justices who came to the Court marked as outsiders
by race or religion have struggled to define the appropriate
scope of their empathy for, in Justice Thomas's words, "the little
guy." Justice Felix Frankfurter claimed for himself a unique capacity for empathy with the outsider because of his membership
in (in his words) "the most vilified and persecuted minority in
history." 149 But Frankfurter never developed a jurisprudence of
empathy for the outsider. He became instead, in the words of
one commentator, "an overeager apologist for the existing order."150 On the other hand, Justices Louis Brandeis and Thurgood Marshall more eagerly embraced their status as outsiders
in developing judicial philosophies that were more indulgent of
the claims of the little guy and more suspicious of the existing
order-even though their views often placed them in lonely dissent.151 If Justice Thomas chooses the path he identified at his
raw potential for dangerous crime-in common. People develop defenses to protect
themselves from the anxiety of such insights, and one common mechanism of defense is
what psychoanalytic theory calls "reaction formation." See Lawrence Pervin, Personality: Theory Assessment, and Research 231-33 (Wiley, 1970). In reaction formation, a person "defends against expression of an unacceptable impulse by only recognizing and expressing its opposite," often in a rigid and exaggerated way. !d. at 232. In this way, a
person trying in good faith to place himself in the shoes of a criminal might well be led to
express great hostility toward him, rather than compassion. One prominent psychiatrist
has argued that this dynamic of defense is at the heart of the criminal sanction generally.
See Karl A. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 153 (The Viking Press, Inc., 1968)
("We need criminals to identify ourselves with, to secretly envy, and to stoutly punish.
Criminals represent our alter egos-our 'bad' selves-rejected and projected. They do
for us the forbidden, illegal things we wish to do and, like scapegoats of old, they bear the
burdens of our displaced guilt and punishment(.]"); cf. Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell?
Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1149,
1235-36 (1990) (suggesting that retributive urge may stem from recognition that criminals
are "no different from us.").
149. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
150. Robert A. Burt, Two Jewish Justices 60 (U. of California Press, 1988); see also
H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 171-76, 191-200 (Basic Books, Inc., 1981)
(describing singlemindedness of Frankfurter's commitment to judicial deference to the
majoritarian branches, even in areas of individual liberties).
151. See Burt, Two Jewish Justices at 6-36 (cited in note 150) (describing Brandeis's
"self-conscious marginality" and "passionate espousal of the outsider's perspective"
throughout his career); William J. Daniels, Justice Thurgood Marshall: The Race for
Equal Justice, in Charles M. Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern, eds., The Burger Court 212,
235 (U. of ~l~inois Press, 1991) (describing Marshall's commitment to the disadvantaged
and his positiOn as "foremost a dissenter" on the Burger Court). For a perceptive discussion of Brandeis's autonomy and detachment from the established order-and even at
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hearings, he will not walk alone; he will have the rich and varied
experiences of those who went before him as a guide.
There is little in Justice Thomas's record in criminal cases to
date that shows him attempting the decidedly tricky task of allowing his professed kinship with the inmate on the prison bus to
influence his outlook. With each passing term, his commitment
to the task seems more questionable. 152 But it is a task he set out
for himself in a very public way. If he has the will, his youth and
his life tenure leave him plenty of time to attempt it.

times from the perspective of his own clients-see Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate:
Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 Yale L.J. 1445 (1996).
152. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1971 (1997) (Thomas, J.) (rule
requiring jury instruction to capital sentencing jury that life sentence means life without
parole where state argues defendant's future dangerousness was new rule and therefore
unavailable to capital defendant on habeas corpus); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072,
2076 (1997) (Thomas, J.) (statute permitting indefinite commitment upon expiration of
criminal sentence of those with abnormality or disorder making them likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence does not violate the Constitution).

